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ESSAY 
 
COULD THE SEC SAVE BASIC THROUGH RULEMAKING? 
ANEIL KOVVALI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 forbids material 
misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security.1 The federal courts have held that this rule implies a cause of 
action that permits private plaintiffs to recover damages where they can 
show that a misrepresentation or omission caused them to suffer a loss 
because they traded in reliance on it.2  
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court held that under certain cir-
cumstances, investor-plaintiffs could satisfy the reliance requirement by 
invoking a rebuttable presumption.3 Under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market 
theory, anyone who purchases or sells a security traded on a market that 
efficiently incorporates information implicitly relies on the integrity of the 
security’s market price. Thus, if the market price of such a security is 
affected by a misrepresentation, persons transacting in the security are 
presumed to have relied on that misrepresentation.4 The Basic presumption 
facilitates class actions, since it replaces individualized inquiries into 
whether each plaintiff was aware of and relied upon a misrepresentation 
 
† Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The views expressed in this Essay are my own, 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the firm or its clients. I thank Joseph Grundfest, 
Alexander Sarch, Bianca Nunes, and Jessica Rice for thoughtful comments and suggestions. Any 
remaining errors are mine. 
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  
2 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013). 
3 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988). 
4 Id. at 247. 
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with a common inquiry into the efficiency of the market and the nature of the 
misrepresentation.5 Because of the importance of class actions to the nation’s 
securities regime, Basic has become a foundational securities law doctrine. 
But Basic has also faced substantial criticism. This criticism bubbled over 
in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, where four 
Justices signaled their willingness to reconsider Basic.6 Soon after, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,7 
and is set to decide the continuing validity of Basic this Term.8 The existing 
regime for enforcement of the securities laws is thus under serious threat, and 
the question for the SEC is whether the agency can do anything about it.  
The SEC has signed on to an amicus brief urging the Court to reaffirm 
Basic,9 but the agency’s Section 10(b) rulemaking authority suggests that it 
may have a more powerful tool at its disposal. In recent years, other agen-
cies have reacted to judicial threats to their agenda through rulemaking. 
When the Supreme Court seemed poised to hold that disparate impact 
theories of relief were not available under the Fair Housing Act,10 the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reacted by 
proposing a rule that would resolve the statutory ambiguity in favor of the 
disparate impact theory.11 Because of the familiar administrative law 
 
5 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1193. 
6 See id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring) (inviting a case in which the issue is properly presented); 
id. at 1204, 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Basic as an “arguably regrettable” “four-Justice 
opinion” whose rule is “found nowhere in the United States Code or in the common law of fraud 
or deception”); id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating, in a portion of the opinion joined 
by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, that “[t]he Basic decision itself is questionable”). 
7 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013). In the interest of full disclosure, prior to my employment at 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, attorneys at the firm submitted a brief on behalf of amici in 
Halliburton, urging that the Court reject the Basic presumption. See Brief for Former SEC 
Commissioners & Officials & Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Halliburton, 
134 S. Ct. 636 (No. 13-317), 2014 WL 69391. 
8 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/halliburton-co-v-erica-p-john-fund-inc (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
9 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7-13, Hallibur-
ton, 134 S. Ct. 636 (No. 13-317), 2014 WL 466853. 
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (making it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the mak-
ing of a bona fide offer . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because 
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”). On November 7, 2011, the Court 
granted certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher to address whether disparate impact claims were cognizable 
under the Act. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). It had recently concluded that a similarly worded provision in 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012), did not permit disparate 
impact theories of relief. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). I assisted 
counsel for the respondent in Magner, as part of Harvard Law School’s Supreme Court Clinic.  
11 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, �� Fed. Reg. 
��,��� (proposed Nov. ��, ����) (to be codified at �� C.F.R. pt. ���). 
13 Kovvali Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/16/2014 1:42 PM 
2014] Could the SEC Save Basic Through Rulemaking? 189 
doctrine of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,12 
HUD’s rulemaking had the potential to reshape the outcome of the case.13 
Under Chevron, courts will defer to an agency’s reasonable resolution of a 
statutory ambiguity, provided that Congress empowered the agency to 
speak to the issue with the force of law.14 If the Supreme Court had held 
that the Fair Housing Act was at least ambiguous as to the applicability of 
the disparate impact theory, it may well have found itself obligated to defer 
to the agency’s formally stated position on the question. Similarly, the SEC 
might attempt through rulemaking to fortify Basic before the Supreme 
Court decides Halliburton, or even to revive Basic after the decision if it 
suffers a defeat.15 
This Essay considers the SEC’s capacity to defend Basic. Although the 
question is close, there are substantial grounds for skepticism of the SEC’s 
power in this area. Absent a rulemaking, it seems unlikely that the SEC’s 
position will command material deference from the Supreme Court. 
Rulemaking may not change this outcome. Although several scholars have 
concluded that the SEC has rulemaking authority over the private right of 
action inferred from Rule 10b-5, the terms of Congress’s grant of rulemak-
ing authority to the SEC suggest that it has not been delegated such 
authority. However, if the SEC can clear that hurdle, it may succeed in 
obtaining its favored result. 
I. CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is 
unlawful for any person “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”16 Without additional action by the SEC, the statute would not 
 
12 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
13 The Court never decided Magner because the parties agreed to dismiss the case. See Mag-
ner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing writ of certiorari); Lyle Denniston, Fair 
Housing Case Dismissed, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/fair-
housing-case-dismissed (noting that the position of petitioners—city officials in St. Paul, 
Minnesota—was weakened by HUD’s proposed rulemaking, which was designed to clearly 
establish disparate impact liability). 
14 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.  
15 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) 
(“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise 
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows 
from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
16 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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forbid anything. It simply grants the SEC the authority to promulgate rules 
that prohibit manipulative or deceptive conduct. 
The SEC exercised this authority by promulgating Rule 10b-5, which 
makes it unlawful to, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, 
“make any untrue statement of a material fact,” or “engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person.”17 Rule 10b-5 is the true acorn from which the 
judicial oak of the private right of action has grown. Without Rule 10b-5, 
Section 10(b) would not impose any duties, and thus there would be no 
duties for litigants to enforce through private lawsuits. 
Because of this regulatory structure, the SEC has a plausible claim to 
deference as to the validity of Basic even without further rulemaking. Under 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., courts will ordinarily defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless that interpretation “is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”18 Unlike its more 
famous cousin, Chevron deference,19 Seminole Rock deference’s availability 
does not depend on whether the agency expressed its interpretation formally 
or informally: there would be little purpose to a doctrine calling for deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of its rules, but only if the agency expressed its 
interpretation through more rules. To the extent that the Basic doctrine can 
be framed as resolving an ambiguity in Rule 10b-5, Seminole Rock would 
suggest that courts should defer to the SEC’s position on its validity, even 
though that position was expressed only in an amicus brief. 
However, the SEC has not had much luck invoking Seminole Rock. In a 
recent opinion, the Supreme Court observed that it had “previously expressed 
skepticism over the degree to which the SEC should receive deference 
regarding the [Rule 10b-5] private right of action.”20 
This skepticism is well grounded in more general administrative law 
doctrines. For example, an agency is not entitled to Seminole Rock deference 
where its regulation merely “parrot[s]” the text of the underlying statute.21 
 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
18 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). Seminole Rock deference is sometimes referred to as Auer defer-
ence. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  
19 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (noting that, as a prerequisite to Chev-
ron deference, “the rule must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated”).  
20 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 n.8 (2011) (citing 
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977)). 
21 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257 (declining to give Auer deference to the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of his own regulation).  
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Although the text of Rule 10b-5 does not copy the text of Section 10(b),22 
the antiparroting principle is nonetheless implicated. The question before 
the Court is the validity of the Basic presumption, and no textual difference 
between Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) speaks to that question.23 In other 
words, to the extent that Section 10(b) is ambiguous as to the validity of 
Basic, Rule 10b-5 parrots that ambiguity.24 It would thus be difficult for the 
SEC to frame its position on Basic as an interpretation of Rule 10b-5 and 
claim the benefits of Seminole Rock deference. Instead, an informal state-
ment on Basic’s validity would merely be an informal attempt to resolve an 
ambiguity in Section 10(b) and would attract little deference.25 
Seminole Rock has also seen its share of criticism. In Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s view, Seminole Rock disrespects the principle of separation of powers 
by allowing agencies to exercise both lawmaking and interpretive authority: 
an agency exercises lawmaking power by promulgating a rule, and Seminole 
Rock permits the agency to exercise interpretive power by supplying the 
controlling interpretation of that rule.26 In a separate concurrence, Chief 
Justice John Roberts acknowledged Justice Scalia’s argument and invited 
future litigants to bring the Supreme Court a case in which “the issue is 
properly raised and argued.”27 Chief Justice Roberts may be the swing vote in 
Halliburton,28 and his apparent sympathy for the separation-of-powers 
criticism of Seminole Rock may well lead him to conclude that deference is 
not warranted.  
 
22 If anything, the text of Rule 10b-5 parrots the text of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under 
the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 980 n.71 (1994) 
(providing a blackline comparison between Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a)). 
23 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257 (declining to give Auer deference—i.e., Seminole Rock defer-
ence—in part because the government did “not suggest that its interpretation turn[ed] on any 
difference between the statutory and regulatory language”); see also Aneil Kovvali, Seminole Rock 
and the Separation of Powers, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 864 (2013). 
24 Indeed, Rule 10b-5 arguably is more hostile to Basic than Section 10(b). Unlike Section 
10(b), Rule 10b-5 refers to “deceit,” which is a traditional common law tort with the “core 
requirement of reliance.” John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market 
Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1757 (2013). By contrast, Section 10(b) speaks more generally of 
“manipulative or deceptive device[s].” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
25 See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258 (determining that the Attorney General’s informal 
interpretation was not entitled to deference under Chevron). 
26 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
27 Id. at 1338-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justice Alito.  
28 Chief Justice Roberts did not join any opinion criticizing Basic in the Amgen case, see 
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), but he is often aligned 
with the four Justices who did.  
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Indeed, an SEC interpretation of Rule 10b-� would offer a particularly 
stark illustration of Justice Scalia’s views. Not all agency interpretations of 
agency rules amount to a combination of interpretive and lawmaking power. 
Often, an agency rule merely clarifies a duty imposed by the underlying 
statute, and is thus a product of interpretive power alone. An agency 
interpretation of such a rule does not present the dangers Justice Scalia 
identified.29 But, as noted above, Section 10(b), standing alone, imposes no 
duties.30 Rule 10b-5 is thus a product of lawmaking power in its purest 
sense, since it creates a duty where none existed before. It follows that SEC 
interpretations of Rule 10b-5 are at the core of the separation-of-powers 
critique of Seminole Rock. Cases based on Rule 10b-5 also have potential 
rhetorical value to those who believe that new restraints on agency power are 
necessary. It would be difficult to describe Rule 10b-5 as an attempt to clarify 
Section 10(b), since it offers little additional guidance. Instead, it represents 
an agency’s attempt to exercise the full extent of its delegated power. 
Even if the Court denies the SEC Seminole Rock deference, the SEC’s 
position should attract deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.31 Under 
Skidmore, courts recognize that an agency’s position has the “power to 
persuade,” given the agency’s experience and expertise in administering a 
particular statutory regime.32 Yet there is little reason to believe that 
Skidmore will make the difference in the Court’s consideration of Basic. 
First, Skidmore is limited in its effect. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that even a law review article is “relevant to the extent it is persuasive”;33 
extending the same courtesy to an agency’s position barely qualifies as 
deference.34 Given the passions surrounding Basic, it is unlikely that a 
Justice inclined to eliminate the presumption would be persuaded to rule 
otherwise because of Skidmore. Second, unlike Seminole Rock, the weight 
accorded an agency interpretation under Skidmore depends in part on the 
 
29 See Kovvali, supra note 23, at 849-50 (arguing that the separation-of-powers criticism of 
Seminole Rock applies only to statutes that “allow an agency to unify the powers of lawmaking and 
law-exposition”).  
30 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17. 
31 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
32 Id. at 140. 
33 United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 568 (2013). 
34 See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144-46 (2012) (suggesting that Skidmore is 
qualitatively different from deference doctrines like Chevron, since under Skidmore the agency’s 
position serves merely “as an element of independent judicial judgment”). 
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process that the agency used to announce its position.35 An agency’s amicus 
brief has only limited power to persuade, since it does not incorporate 
meaningful feedback from the public.36 
In sum, it is unlikely that the SEC would be able to alter the holding of 
Halliburton absent rulemaking. 
II. RULEMAKING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The SEC could use its power under Section 10(b) to promulgate a 
notice-and-comment rule allowing private plaintiffs to invoke the Basic 
presumption. Such a rule would warrant a different analysis. As noted 
above, Chevron commands the courts to defer to certain agency interpreta-
tions of statutes. The Chevron analysis begins with a “Step Zero” inquiry,37 
which asks whether Congress intended the agency’s ruling to have the 
“force of law.”38 If Step Zero is satisfied, courts proceed with the Chevron 
two-step, asking first whether the statute speaks clearly to the question at 
issue and second, if the statute does not provide a clear answer, whether the 
agency’s resolution of the statutory ambiguity is reasonable.39 Step Zero 
may be the tougher test for the SEC: the text of Section 10(b) provides 
reasons for skepticism as to the SEC’s authority to speak to the validity of 
the Basic doctrine with the force of law. Steps One and Two are less likely 
to present an obstacle for the SEC. 
A. Chevron “Step Zero” 
The Supreme Court has explained that Chevron deference is only appropri-
ate where Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to speak to a 
question with the force of law. Although academic commentators have taken 
the position that the SEC has rulemaking authority over Basic, the language of 
Section 10(b) does not clearly support that position. This might lead a court to 
conclude that an SEC rule codifying Basic is unworthy of deference. 
 
35 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (noting that the weight of an agency’s interpretation “will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,” among other factors). 
36 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 (2012) (noting that 
the Department of Labor’s position “plainly lack[ed] the hallmarks of thorough consideration,” in 
part because the agency’s announcement of its interpretation in a series of amicus briefs did not 
provide an opportunity for public comment). 
37 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. ���, ��� (����) (defining Chevron 
Step Zero as “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”). 
38 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
39 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
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1. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett 
In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, the Supreme Court explained that an 
executive agency’s position was not entitled to Chevron deference because 
the agency lacked “administrative authority” over the statutory “enforce-
ment provisions” at issue.40 Adams Fruit concerned the motor vehicle safety 
provisions of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
(AWPA), which mandated that the Secretary of Labor “promulgate stand-
ards” relating to the safety of vehicles used to transport migrant farmworkers.41 
The AWPA also created a private right of action that “provided aggrieved 
farmworkers with direct recourse to federal court where their rights under 
the statute [we]re violated.”42  
The Supreme Court refused to defer to the Department of Labor’s posi-
tion that a state workers’ compensation law displaced the private right of 
action.43 The Court saw no statutory ambiguity for the agency to resolve.44 
But the Court explained further that the agency had also failed to satisfy “[a] 
precondition to deference under Chevron,” namely, “a congressional delega-
tion of administrative authority.”45 By expressly creating a private right of 
action, Congress “established an enforcement scheme independent of the 
Executive.”46 Congress had only given the Secretary of Labor the authority 
“to promulgate standards implementing AWPA’s motor vehicle provisions,” 
which did “not empower the Secretary to regulate the scope of the judicial 
power vested by the statute.”47 Since Congress had not delegated to the 
Secretary the authority to limit the scope of the private right of action, the 
Secretary’s views on the issue were not entitled to Chevron deference.48 
2. The Grant of Rulemaking Power in Section 10(b) 
Given the precedent of Adams Fruit, the SEC’s ability to obtain defer-
ence in its defense of Basic depends on the scope of its rulemaking authority 
under Section 10(b). Commentators have urged that the SEC has sufficient 
 
40 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990). 
41 Id. at 650; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012). 
42 Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650. 
43 Id. at 649 (quoting the agency’s interpretation expressed in 29 C.F.R. § 500.122(b) (1989)). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 650. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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rulemaking authority to overturn Basic,49 or even to “disimply” the entire 
private right of action under Section 10(b).50 While these commentators are 
hostile to Basic,51 their position suggests that the SEC indeed has the 
rulemaking authority to speak with the “force of law” to the question of 
Basic’s validity.  
This position is based on the observation that Section 10(b) grants rule-
making authority to the SEC and that Basic is a judicially created doctrine 
used to implement the resulting Rule 10b-5. As Professor Grundfest has 
reasoned, the SEC’s greater power to eliminate Rule 10b-5 altogether 
through rulemaking suggests a lesser power to curtail the ability of private 
plaintiffs to enforce it through lawsuits.52  
However, there are at least two grounds for doubting the SEC’s power 
to promulgate a rule declaring that Basic is valid.53 Professor Grundfest’s 
argument is based on the SEC’s power to destroy, not to create. The SEC 
could eliminate Rule 10b-5, and thus eliminate all lawsuits based on Rule 
10b-5 violations. The power to eliminate all liability under Rule 10b-5 
suggests a power to more narrowly eliminate the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption in private lawsuits under the rule.54 While the power to 
 
49 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 165 (2011). 
50 Grundfest, supra note 22, at 976-78. 
51 Professors Bratton and Wachter argue that Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory “should be 
abolished in cases where the issuer makes no trades.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 49, at 75-76. 
Professor Grundfest has urged total abolition of the private cause of action, supra note 22, at 965-
66, and has since made clear his view that Basic cannot be reconciled with the text of the securities 
laws. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 40-43 
(Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series No. 150, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2317537. 
52 See Grundfest, supra note 22, at 976-78. 
53 A separate consideration might limit the SEC’s ability to stop the Supreme Court from 
tinkering at the margins of Basic. The Court might interpret Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to 
require additional showings from plaintiffs at the class certification stage. The SEC would likely 
be unable to change the outcome of such a decision, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
well outside its purview. At oral argument in Halliburton, Justice Kennedy, a professed Basic 
skeptic, see supra note �, expressed apparent enthusiasm for a doctrine that would require plaintiffs 
in 10b-� actions to introduce at the class certification stage event studies showing that the 
misrepresentation distorted prices. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, 29, Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (No. 13-317), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-317_7n5f.pdf. Justice Kagan and the government attorney 
representing the SEC’s position sought to shift the conversation from procedure back to substance, a 
domain where deference to the agency position would be more plausible. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra, at 48-49. 
54 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 49, at 165 (suggesting that the power to foreclose all 
private lawsuits entails a corresponding power to foreclose some private lawsuits, that is, those 
that can succeed only because of the Basic presumption). 
13 Kovvali Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/16/2014 1:42 PM 
196 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 162: 187 
 
eliminate all private lawsuits does suggest a power to eliminate some law-
suits, it may not suggest a power to permit lawsuits that the courts would 
not otherwise allow. 
The text of Section ��(b) offers another basis for skepticism of the 
SEC’s ability to promulgate a rule that saves Basic. Section 10(b) clearly 
authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules telling potential defendants what 
conduct is and is not lawful,55 but the text is less clear about the SEC’s 
authority to determine which plaintiffs are empowered to seek damages for 
that unlawful conduct. To put the observation in H.L.A. Hart’s terms, 
Section 10(b) grants the SEC rulemaking authority over duty-defining 
“primary” doctrines, but is less clear as to the SEC’s rulemaking authority 
over the “secondary” doctrines that confer on particular plaintiffs the power 
to seek damages.56 
The distinction between primary and secondary doctrines is meaningful 
in the Rule 10b-5 context. For example, a person can violate the primary 
rules, and thus become criminally liable and civilly liable to the SEC, even 
if no actual transaction takes place.57 However, in order to satisfy the 
secondary rules and bring a successful action for damages, a private plaintiff 
must show that she actually bought or sold the affected security.58 
While the text of Section 10(b) clearly grants the SEC rulemaking 
authority over the content of primary doctrines, it is less clear about the 
SEC’s rulemaking authority over the content of secondary doctrines. 
Section 10(b) forbids the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe.”59 This language empowers the SEC to tell defendants whether 
certain conduct constitutes a violation. It does not explicitly empower the 
SEC to determine whether a private plaintiff ’s lawsuit enforcing a primary 
doctrine can proceed. In the words of Adams Fruit, the text of the statute 
 
55 See supra text accompanying note 16.  
56 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1994) (distinguishing between 
“primary” rules that “impose duties” and “secondary” rules that “confer powers”). 
57 See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S 813, 819-20 (2002) (noting, with apparent approval, the SEC’s 
position that “a broker who accepts payment for securities that he never intends to deliver . . . 
violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”). 
58 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975) (holding “that the 
plaintiff class for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private damage actions is limited to 
purchasers and sellers of securities”). 
59 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added).  
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only grants the SEC the power “to promulgate standards” of conduct for 
regulated entities.60 
Any limits on the SEC’s power over secondary doctrines would affect its 
capacity to save Basic, since Basic itself is a secondary doctrine. To prevail 
against a defendant in a civil suit or administrative action, the SEC does 
not need to show reliance.61 As a result, Basic has nothing to do with the 
question of whether a defendant’s conduct contravenes Rule 10b-5. Basic 
merely affects the success of a private plaintiff ’s attempt to enforce Rule 
10b-5. The content of Basic also reveals that it is a secondary doctrine, since 
it speaks to the plaintiff ’s conduct, not the defendant’s.62 Thus, it is far from 
 
60 Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990). This limitation on the SEC’s 
rulemaking authority harmonizes it with the SEC’s enforcement authority. The SEC can proceed 
against defendants in court or through administrative enforcement actions. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012) (providing for civil actions); id. § 21B, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-2 (providing for administrative proceedings); id. § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (providing 
for cease-and-desist proceedings). The adjudicative process allows the agency to announce a 
formal position on the legal questions in the case before the courts have the opportunity to weigh 
in. See id. § ��(a)(�), �� U.S.C. § ��y(a)(�) (providing for judicial review of final orders by the 
SEC). For Chevron purposes, a formal agency position announced through adjudication normally 
has the same claim to deference as a formal position announced through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. See, e.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819-20 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 229-30 & 230 n.12 (2001)).  
Though they are powerful tools in the SEC’s arsenal, adjudications only enable the SEC to 
take a formal position on primary doctrines. It is difficult to imagine a case in which a secondary 
doctrine—that is, a doctrine concerning the ability of a private plaintiff to bring a lawsuit—would 
come up in an administrative action pitting a defendant against the SEC. The regime created by 
Congress thus grants the SEC greater power over primary doctrines than over secondary 
doctrines. This represents a deliberate choice, since Congress could easily have created an 
alternative regime that granted the SEC more power to take binding positions on secondary 
doctrines. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship 
Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354-58 (2008) 
(suggesting that Congress grant the SEC the authority to decide whether a complainant can file a 
securities fraud action). Congress’s more restrictive approach suggests that the SEC’s positions on 
secondary doctrines are entitled to less deference, and prevents the SEC from commanding 
greater deference through an administrative adjudication. 
61 Reliance is “an essential element” of private causes of action under § 10(b) because “proof 
of reliance ensures that there is a proper connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and 
a plaintiff ’s injury.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a government agency charged with enforcing 
the securities laws, the SEC does not need to prove reliance in order to establish the right to 
pursue a defendant’s wrongdoing. Therefore, the SEC need not prove reliance to bring a 
successful civil action. See, e.g., SEC v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citing SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 195 F. Supp. 2d 475, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
62 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
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clear that Section 10(b) grants the SEC rulemaking authority over the Basic 
doctrine.63 
The SEC might respond by arguing that its clear rulemaking authority 
over primary doctrines gives it the power to shape the content of secondary 
doctrines like Basic. Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 explicitly provides 
for a private right of action. Instead, the courts inferred the private right of 
action from the wrongs defined by the statute and rule.64 The secondary 
doctrines that govern the private right of action are thus derived from the 
primary doctrines that define whether a defendant’s conduct is wrongful. As 
a result, secondary doctrines like Basic are not as isolated from the SEC’s 
power over primary doctrines as they might at first appear.  
Applying this reasoning, it may be possible to frame the secondary doc-
trine of Basic as a derivation of an implicit primary doctrine. In other 
words, the plaintiff-facing doctrine of Basic might be seen as a reflection of 
the courts’ sense that certain defendants have committed a distinctive type 
of wrong. For example, in a recent article, Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky argue that Basic is not merely an evidentiary presumption that 
allows plaintiffs to prove reliance in a distinctive way; rather, Basic expanded 
the substance of the private cause of action to reach a different type of 
wrong.65 Before Basic, the private cause of action allowed plaintiffs to 
recover for the substantive wrong of deceit—the wrong of making knowingly 
false assertions that sabotaged the plaintiffs’ decisions.66 After Basic, the 
private cause of action allows plaintiffs to recover for the wrong of dis-
torting the market price of a security, thus causing economic loss to a 
plaintiff who traded in the justifiable belief that the price was not distorted.67 
 
63 The SEC likely also lacks the ability to codify Basic via its general grant of rulemaking 
authority under section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2012), 
since the SEC is neither charged with the “implement[ation]” of the secondary doctrines that 
define the private right of action nor “responsible” for their terms. Even if a rule codifying Basic 
would be within the rulemaking authority described in section 23, however, the language and 
structure of the statutory scheme may suggest that such a rule would not be entitled to the normal 
measure of Chevron deference. Congress’s grant of rulemaking authority in Section 10(b) is more 
specific than the general grant in section ��, and its seeming exclusion of secondary doctrines is a 
powerful indication that Congress did not intend that the courts defer to the SEC regarding the 
content of these doctrines. Cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875-77 (2013) (Breyer, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (examining numerous aspects of the 
statutory scheme before deferring to an agency position articulated in a rule promulgated pursuant 
to a general grant of rulemaking authority).  
64 See Grundfest, supra note 22, at 964-65 & 964 n.3. 
65 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 24, at 1791. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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If Basic can be framed as implying a distinctive type of duty, it might come 
within the reach of the SEC’s authority. Even if this reasoning is insuffi-
cient to convince a court that the SEC can regulate Basic directly, the SEC 
might rework the primary doctrine and leave the rest of the work to the 
courts.68 Depending on the SEC’s ability to characterize the issue, the 
courts may well conclude that Congress granted the SEC the power to 
speak to Basic’s validity with the force of law. 
B. The Chevron Two-Step 
If a court concludes that an agency is authorized to speak with the force 
of law, it then proceeds with a two-step analysis. First, it applies the 
ordinary tools of statutory construction to determine “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”69 But “if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the 
court must proceed to the second step and ask “whether the agency’s answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”70 
There are as many ways of understanding Chevron as there are adminis-
trative law professors.71 For present purposes, Chevron might be understood 
as an allocation of interpretative labor. When confronted with a statutory 
question, courts first employ “traditional tools,”72 such as textual analysis. 
Where those standard legal tools provide an answer, the courts declare that 
the statute is clear and end their inquiry. Where those tools do not provide 
an answer, the courts could take a second step, using tools more common to 
policymaking to decide the case. Indeed, courts will take this second step 
and use policymaking tools themselves if no deference-worthy agency 
position is available. But where such a position exists, Chevron presumes 
 
68 For example, the SEC might adopt a rule making it unlawful to cause an economic loss to 
a purchaser or seller of a security traded in an efficient market by distorting the market price of 
that security through a misstatement or omission of material fact. This is a primary doctrine—on 
its face it addresses only whether a defendant’s conduct is unlawful. But if a court derived 
secondary doctrines from this hypothetical rule, it likely would replicate Basic. 
69 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). 
70 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
71 Scholars have even managed to disagree on the number of steps in the Chevron analysis. 
Compare Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 597 (2009), with Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 611 (2009).  
72 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). 
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that Congress would rather have agency experts than generalist judges wield 
these policymaking tools.73  
As a result, if the Justices of the Supreme Court were to overturn Basic, 
it would matter how they did it. If they reached the result using the stand-
ard legal tools that characterize Step One, an SEC rule codifying Basic 
would not survive judicial review. If, however, they used policy or empirical 
considerations more characteristic of Step Two, a well-reasoned SEC rule 
could save Basic. 
1. Step One 
The above framing of the Step One inquiry might make the answer 
seem obvious. How could the Court conclude that the statutory text clearly 
establishes the invalidity of Basic? On its face, Section 10(b) is completely 
silent on the issue, as it is on most issues concerning the private right of 
action. In addition, the Supreme Court itself found that Basic represented 
the best resolution of ambiguities in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.74 
It would be awkward for the Court to hold that the doctrine it announced in 
Basic involved such a misapplication of traditional legal tools.75 
But the simple awkwardness of declaring Supreme Court precedent 
unreasonable may not stay the hand of a Justice who believes that Basic is 
clearly inconsistent with the statute. And there are serious textual argu-
ments suggesting that the Basic presumption is incompatible with Section 
10(b). Analogizing to other statutory causes of action, Professor Grundfest 
has argued that the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 must include a 
robust reliance element.76 
If the Supreme Court rejects Basic on these grounds, an SEC rule codi-
fying it would fail at Step One of the Chevron analysis. 
 
73 For a broadly similar view of Chevron and its foundations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2591-95 (2006). 
74 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1988).  
75 Cf. Noah Feldman, Supreme Court Isn’t Impressed by Market Efficiency, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-06/supreme-court-isn-t-impressed- 
by-market-efficiency (suggesting that at oral argument in Halliburton, conservative Justices framed 
their attack on Basic in economic terms to avoid awkwardness); cf. also infra subsection II.B.2. 
76 See Grundfest, supra note 51, at 4-5 (arguing, based on an analogy to the express private 
right of action provided for in section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) 
(2012), for actual reliance as a precondition to recovery under Section 10(b)). 
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2. Step Two 
But there is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court would frame 
a decision rejecting or narrowing Basic in terms more characteristic of 
Chevron Step Two.  
The Basic Court explained that its decision was based on a policy of 
encouraging investors to rely on the integrity of the financial markets, and 
on empirical studies regarding market efficiency.77 Even Basic’s critics seem 
to have embraced this framing of the issue. In Amgen, Justice Alito described 
Basic’s validity as a question of empirical fact rather than legal reasoning.78 
Commentators have attempted to answer these empirical questions using 
statutory text,79 but even these textual arguments can only be evaluated 
with careful attention to subtle technical issues.80 The Court has seen little 
 
77 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47. 
78 See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (noting that it may be appropriate to reconsider Basic given the existence of “more 
recent evidence suggest[ing] that the presumption may rest on a faulty economic premise”). 
Similarly, at oral argument in Halliburton, Chief Justice Roberts insisted that the debate over Basic 
had been framed in empirical terms. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 53, at 10-11. This 
framing of the issue is not mandatory. Basic could be understood not as an empirical statement 
about market efficiency, but as a normative statement that investors are entitled to rely on the 
integrity of market prices in certain circumstances. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: 
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 160.  
79 In a package of securities litigation reforms, Congress adopted a ninety-day look-back 
provision limiting the damages awarded to a plaintiff to “the difference between the purchase or 
sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean 
trading price of that security during the 90-day period” following the revelation of the fraud. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Commentators have inferred from this text that Congress 
believes that the market systematically overreacts to the revelation of fraud (thus creating 
opportunities for traders to make consistent above-average returns) and that the market takes 
ninety days to fully process the discovery of fraud; they have urged that such beliefs are incon-
sistent with the idea that a security’s price quickly and accurately incorporates all material public 
information. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 51, at 41-42. 
80 First, the ninety-day look-back provision may only reflect a belief that a company’s stock 
price is volatile in the wake of revelations of fraud. Such volatility would not be inconsistent with 
market efficiency. In the wake of a fraud, investors might rationally discount all the information 
they had received up to that point. As a result, new rumors would have an outsized effect on the 
total mix of information available, and thus would have an outsized effect on the security’s price. 
Second, even if the ninety-day look-back provision reflects Congress’s belief that the market 
systematically overreacts to fraud, thus making it possible for an ordinary investor to reap above-
average profits by purchasing the stock of companies that have recently disclosed a fraud, this 
would not be inconsistent with market efficiency. Even in an efficient market, traders can reap 
outsized expected returns if they are prepared to take outsized risks. The market’s seeming 
overreaction may simply represent its effort to price in the riskiness of fraud-buffeted stock. See 
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE 19-20 (2000) (noting that efficient market hypothesis proponents have explained away 
seeming arbitrage opportunities by suggesting that the factors leading to above-average returns 
also create above-average risk). 
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reason to defer to the SEC where the questions presented could be resolved 
without reference to economics.81 The validity of Basic may well fall into a 
different category. 
The nature of the issue itself also suggests that practical considerations 
rather than textual ones will drive the analysis. As noted above, the doc-
trines surrounding Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can be divided into two 
categories: the primary doctrines that determine the lawfulness of a defend-
ant’s conduct and the secondary doctrines that determine whether a plaintiff 
can bring a successful lawsuit. The courts employ different methodologies 
in elaborating on primary and secondary doctrines. Statutory text is at the 
center of cases addressing primary doctrines.82 By contrast, the courts 
emphasize “practical factors” in establishing secondary doctrines like Basic.83 
Part of this divergence is simple necessity. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
explicitly address the primary doctrines defining what conduct is unlawful. But 
“[n]o language in either of those provisions speaks at all” to the secondary 
doctrines that govern “the contours of a private cause of action.”84 
The fairness concerns that motivate a strong emphasis on text in the 
primary context also have less force in the secondary context. It would be 
unfair to subject a person to criminal or civil liability for her conduct unless 
she had notice that her conduct was unlawful. As a result, it would be unfair 
to base the primary doctrines that determine the lawfulness of that conduct 
on considerations that are not evident from the face of the statute and rule. 
But a person who engages in unlawful conduct has no right to a precise 
estimate of her eventual civil liability. 
Basic offers a particularly stark illustration of this point. Suppose that in 
a world without Basic, Doris publicly misstates a material fact with fraudu-
lent intent. Having made the statement, Doris has no way of knowing 
whether she will be civilly liable to Peter, a stranger transacting in the 
affected security. Peter might rely on Doris’s misstatement, in which case 
Doris will be civilly liable to him. Doris has no control over or knowledge 
 
81 See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 n.8 
(2011) (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977)). 
82 See, e.g., id. at 2302, 2305 (relying on a dictionary-based argument in holding that a de-
fendant did not “make” a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5). 
83 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (citing practical 
considerations in holding that plaintiffs cannot prevail in a Rule 10b-5 suit unless they have actually 
purchased or sold a security). The Supreme Court later held that its conclusion in Blue Chip Stamps 
was based on “‘policy considerations’ which the Court viewed as appropriate in explicating a judicially 
crafted remedy,” not on an interpretation of the “words” of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80, 84 (2006) (citation omitted). 
84 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749. 
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of Peter’s investment process, yet it is “beyond peradventure” that she has 
adequate notice of the possibility that she will be held liable to him.85 Intro-
ducing Basic changes only the likelihood that Doris will be held liable to 
Peter, as Peter will have a claim even in the absence of actual reliance. Since 
Doris was already on notice of the possibility of being held liable to Peter, it 
is hard to see why fundamental fairness requires further notice. As a result, 
fairness does not demand the same emphasis on text in the secondary 
context as it does in the primary context. 
Regardless of the reasons for the difference, the relative unimportance 
of the text means that courts lack an institutional advantage in evaluating 
secondary doctrines like Basic.86 In his dissent in Basic, Justice Byron White 
attacked the majority opinion by noting that the Court lacked “staff economists 
[and] experts.”87 For precisely that reason, the SEC’s position on the 
validity of Basic, if expressed in a well-reasoned rule, would be a strong 
candidate for deference under Chevron.88  
CONCLUSION 
The SEC’s power to defend Basic is somewhat precarious. Unless it 
undertakes a rulemaking, its position is unlikely to command deference 
from the Supreme Court. Yet even an attempted rulemaking might be 
insufficient. Although some scholars have concluded that the SEC has 
rulemaking authority over Rule 10b-5 private actions, the terms of Con-
gress’s grant of authority also support a narrower interpretation that would 
deny the SEC this power. However, if the SEC can clear the rulemaking 
authority hurdle, it may prevail in its defense of Basic. 
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online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-187.pdf. 
 
85 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (declaring the existence 
of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 to be “beyond peradventure”). 
86 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expand-
ing the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 149-54 (2005) (arguing that, where a 
statute is ambiguous, courts should defer to the expertise of agencies to determine the existence of 
a private right of action). 
87 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
88 A rule that is not supported by sufficient reasoning could be deemed invalid. See Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that the SEC “acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously” in promulgating a proxy access rule because it failed to perform an 
adequate economic analysis of the new rule).  
